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Incorporating International Human Rights Law in 
National Constitutions: The South African Experience 
By Penelope E. Andrews 
A. Introduction 
. 
In his 1931 lectures at the University ofldaho College of Law, Professor Manley 
0. Hudson reflected on the benefits and possibilities of a global legal order. His 
vision was one in which the global community of states engaged with, and relied 
upon, the imprimatur of international law. 1 This vision incorporated the idea of 
the United States as a good global citizen, generating an international agenda of 
human rights and good governance. 2 Even though Professor Hudson's insights 
predated the establishment of the United Nations and the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, his sentiments were very much in line 
with chose that spurred, the creation of the modern international legal order. 
The focus of this book is partly to revisit that vision, and partly to explore the 
universal ramifications of that vision. What I intend to do in this chapter is co 
assess the challenge of incorporating and applying international law within 
national legal frameworks, and more specifically international human rights law, 
by examining one case study, namely, South Africa. In particular, I will examine 
how this newly democratized country has incorporated international law into its 
national legal framework, and the possibilities for democracy and human rights 
chat are generated by such incorporation. 
This examination is important because the transition from apartheid to democracy 
in South Africa was of momentous global significance. This democratic transforma-
tion, from a country steeped in authoritarianism and racism, to one predicated on 
international human rights principles, including peaceful co-existence,3 transparency 
and accountability, involved the international community at all stages.4 _The struggle 
1 See generally MANLEY 0. HuosoN, PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1932). 
2 ld.atl03-117. 
3 Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. The President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SALR 637 
(CC) at para. 3 (S. Afr.) (stating, "[t]he Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past 
Miller & Brntspies (Eds), Progress in lncernational Law, pp. 835-854 . 
© 2008 Koninklijke Brill NV, Printed in the Netherlands. 
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against apartheid had an enormous impact on the development of international 
human rights law, specifically the evolving international principles geared toward the 
proscription of apartheid and racism. 5 Indeed, apartheid was declared a crime against 
humanity by the United Nations in 1966.6 Moreover, the struggle against racism and 
for self-determination, pursued mostly by formerly colonized communities, was 
informed by global abhorrence to the policies of apartheid, as illustrated by the 
numerous resolutions passed by the United Nations against the apartheid govern-
ment.7 The post-apartheid democratic state became the first to incorporate interna-
tional human rights principles into its Constitution, and into the structure of its 
system of governance.8 
This chapter assesses the human rights project in South Africa by examining 
first, how international law has been incorporated in South Africa's Bill of Rights. 
Second, this chapter explores the interpretation of these rights by the South 
African Constitutional Court, and more specifically, how the Court has embraced 
international human rights principles in its jurisprudence. This exploration also 
involves examining the strategic choices made by the Court as to how it will 
adopt those principles and under what conditions, as well as when it chooses to 
reject those international human rights principles in favor of a localized reading. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by examining some lessons to be learned from this 
experience, and in particular how the adoption of international legal principles 
by the South African Constitutional Court may provide lessons for countries 
both similarly and differently situated. 
of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conAicc, untold suffering and injustice, and a 
future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence ... ") . 
4 See generally, Loms B. SOHN, RI GHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH AFrucA 
(l 994). 
5 Id.; See also H enry J. Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African 
Bantustan Policy, 17 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978); EDGAR BROOKES, APARTHEID (1968); 
BRIAN BuNTING, THE RisE OF THE SouTH AFRICAN REICH (1986) ; Arthur J. Goldberg, 
The Status of Apartheid Under International Law, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (1985). 
6 Internacional Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 
30, 1973, 101 5 U.N .T.S. 243. 
7 Kevin Hopkins, Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International 
Law and its Part in the South African Transformation, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 24 1 
(200 1-2002). See, e.g., Decade for Action co Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 3057 (XXVlII), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 11 9/ 15 (Nov. 2, 1973). See, e.g., Resolution Against 
Aparth eid in Spores G.A. Res. 40/64, U.N. Doc. N40/53 (D ec. 10, 1985). 
8 For a derailed exploration of the Sauth African Consti tution, see generally, THE PosT APARTHEID 
CONSTITUTIONS (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann, eds., 2001). 
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B. From Apartheid to Democracy 
The period preceding the establishment of the United Nations involved a brief 
moment of global optimism, one that also involved South Africa. Indeed, Jan Smuts, 
the Prime Minister of South Africa at the time, was President of the Committee on 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, and served as a principal drafter of the 
Charter of the United Nations.9 But South Africa's positive involvement in this exer-
cise of global governance was shorclived. In 1948, the Nationalist Party came to 
power in South Africa on a platform of white supremacy, embarking on a Kafkaesque 
project to separate cl1e citizens of South Africa according to clearly demarcated racial 
groups. 10 This project was bolstered by a legal system designed to ensure that all 
aspects of life, including work, marriage, education, health, and cravel1 were rigidly 
regulated. 11 In addition, a brutal security and police apparatus made certain that 
these laws were obeyed and that political dissent was stifled. 12 A cursory reading of 
the volumes of the reports of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission bear testimony to the grotesque lengths the apartheid government 
went, to ensure that the system was reinforced. 13 
This system of apartheid increasingly became of concern to the global commu-
nity, even as the apartheid government was hiding behind the principle of state 
sovereignty. 14 Indeed, it is arguable that the state-centric model of international 
law confronted some ch:illenge, as the United Nations and many governments 
across the world began to recognize the anti-apartheid opposition movements, 
and particularly the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, 
9 SOHN, supra note 4. 
10 In pursuit of chis goal, the apartheid government passed a series of statutes co institutionalize ra-
cial discrimination. These statutes included: Population Ace of 1950; Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act of 1949; Group Areas Act of 1950; The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 
1959. See APARTHEID: THE FACTS, INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND Am FuND (1982) [hereinafter 
APARTHEID: THE fACTS]. 
11 APARTHEID: THE FACTS, supra note 10. 
12 See generally, JOHN DuGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1982); 
see also r NTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAw 
(Geofrey Bindman ed., 1988). 
13 See Truth and Reconcil iation Commission, Final Report, http://www.doj.gov .. za/rrc/report/ 
execsum.hcm. See also, Penelope E. Andrews, Reparatiom for Apartheid's Victims: 7he Path to 
Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1155 (2004); KADER AsMAL, ET AL., REcoNCILIATION 
THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 1997). 
14 See African National Congress, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http:// 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ misc/trc03.html; see also Jacquie Cassette, Towards Justice in the Wake 
of Armed Conflicts? 7he Evolution o/Warm Crimes Tribunals, 9 African Security Review (2000), 
http://www.iss.co.za/ pubs/ ASR/9No5And6/Cassecce. html# Anchor-Conven cion-9012. 
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as representing the majority of South Africans. 15 In addition, once apartheid was 
deemed a crime against humanity by the United Nations, 16 the constant objec-
tions of the South African government co the international consensus against 
apartheid, could not relieve it of its duty to abide by the new international norms. 
Apartheid South Africa is a commonly cited example for the international law 
principle chat the persistent objector rule does not apply where the customary 
international law involves a jus cogens norm. 17 
The international struggle against apartheid underpinned the global fight 
against racism. Many key documents of international human rights law proscrib-
ing racism, most specifically the International Convention of Elimination of All 
Forms of Racism, 18 were developed in response to apartheid. Indeed Henry 
Richardson, 19 Louis Sohn20 and John Dugard21 have in their scholarship traced 
the link berween international law and apartheid. 22 
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when the end of apart-
heid became inevitable, negotiations commenced in South Africa about the shape 
of the future constitutional democracy. These negotiations centered on a range of 
issues relevant to democratic governance, including the question of human rights. 
The general consensus abour the inclusion of civil and political rights in a Bill of 
Rights was established immediacely.23 This was not surprising, in the wake of 
apartheid and its systematic denial of a range of civil and political rights. 
The consensus about the inclusion of social and economic rights, and in particu-
lar, their justiciability, came later. For despite the recognition that the processes of 
apartheid had effectively institutionalized economic inequality, and that the majority 
of black South Africans languished in poverty, there was not general agreement about 
how to attain economic equity.24 
15 See G.A. Res. 37/69, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/69 (Dec. 9, 1982) (calling on the international 
community to reaffirm "the legitimacy of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national 
liberation movement .... ") . 
16 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243,246. 
17 See Jonathan I. Charney, 7he Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 56 BRJT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985). 
18 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
19 See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African 
Bantustan Policy, 17 CowM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978) 
20 See SOl·IN, supra note 4. 
21 See DuGARD, supra note 12. 
22 For a thoughtful discussion dn apartheid and international law, see Goldberg, supra note 5. 
23 See THE SMALL MIRACLE: SOUTH AFRJCAS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (Doreen Atkinson & 
Stephen Friedman eds., 1994). 
24 See Center for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Introduction to Socio-Economic Righrs in 
the Sou th African Constitution, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ centre_projects/ socio/ compilation 1 part l. 
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This also was not surprising. Although the national liberation movements had 
largely been committed to policies of economic redistribution, by the 1990s the 
international consensus had shifted to one in which human rights were embodied 
not by redistribution of material resources in the world, but in legal texts such as 
bills of rights. Indeed Upendra Baxi, the Indian legal scholar, has articulated how 
this text-based version of human rights discourse was seeking to "supplant all 
other ethical discourses."25 In a similar vein, Boa de Sousa Santos, the Portuguese 
scholar, has noted how human rights has become the lingua franca of "progressive 
politics," providing an "emancipatory script" for those seeking redress from 
injustice. 26 
The South African Constitution and its expansive Bill of Rights reflects this 
paradigmatic shift in the characterization and articulation of h:iman rights 
norms. In addition, the South African Constitution represents a vindication of 
decades of human rights activism, not just because of its expressed human rights 
commitment in the Bill of Rights, but also because the Constitution made South 
Africa, formally at least, a version of the penultimate human rights state.27 As 
Makau wa Mutua, the Kenyan human rights scholar notes: 
The construction of the post-apartheid state represents the first deliberate and cal-
culated effort in history to craft a human rights state - a polity that is primarily 
animated by human rights norms. South Africa was the first state to be reborn 
after the universal acc,eptance (at least rhetorically) of human rights ideals by states 
of all the major cultural and political traditions. 28 
If one looks at the trajectory of human rights discourse during the decades fol-
lowing the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including 
those shameful periods when human rights became hostage to cold war politics, 
the South Africa embrace of human rights principles provided a welcoming ray 
of hope. 
html; see also Nicholas Haysom, Giving Effect to Socio-Economic Rights, Community Law Center, 
Socio-Economic Rights Project, Vol. 1 No. 4 (March 1999) at 1, http://www.communitylawcentre 
.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Righcs/esr-review (follow "Download chis edition if1 pelf format" 
hyperlink). 
25 Upendra Baxi, voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L J. OF L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 147 (1998). 
26 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, I ZEITSCHRIFT 
FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1 (1997) (F.R.G.). 
27 Makau wa Mucua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 
10 HARv. HuM. Rrs. L. J. 63 (1997). 
28 Id. ac 65. 
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C. 7he South African Constitution 
The South African Constitution reflects not only the influence of the global human 
rights struggle, but is in many ways a by-product of that struggle. The Constitution 
embraces international law in several ways.29 First, the Constitution's comprehensive 
Bill of Rights30 is drawn entirely from several human rights instruments, including 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights31 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights.32 The Bill of Rights is expansive, incorporating a range of civil and 
political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights .33 Implicit in this com-
prehensive embrace of rights is the notion that rights are interdependent, and that 
civil and political rights reinforce social and economic rights, and vice-versa.34 This 
recognition implicitly eschews a bifurcated or hierarchical approach to rights, in 
favor of one that views all rights as integral to the pursuance of digniry and equiry. 
This vision is further bolstered by the provisions of Article 38 in the Bill of Rights, 
which explicitly renders all rights justiciable.35 
The second way that the Constitution incorporates international law is chat 
Article 39 of the Constitution specifically directs the South African courts co con-
sider international law in their deliberations.36 Finally, Article 232 of the 
Constitution provides for the direct incorporation of international law into the 
29 For a thoughtful analysis of the engagement of the South African Constitution with international 
law, see John Dugacd, International Law and the 'Final' Constitution, 11 SAJHR 241 (1995). 
30 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, The Bill of Rights, ch. 2, available at http://www. info.gov.za/documencs/ 
cons ti tu tion/i ndex. h cm . 
31 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 17 1 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
32 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
33 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30. For a thoughtful discuss ion on the incorporation of 
social and economic rights in the S. AFR. CONST. 1996, see Sandra Liebenberg, 7he International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for South Africa, 11 SAJHR 
359 (1995). 
34 See NEIL MAcCoRMICK, LEGAL RiGHTS AND SocIAL D EMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42 (1982). 
35 See Pierre De Vos, Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights? Social and Economic Rights 
in South Africa's 1996 Constitution, 13 SAJHR 67 (1997); see also Penelope E. Andrews, 7he 
South African Bill of Rights: Lessons for Australia, in CoMPARATrvE PERSPECTIVES ON BILLS OF 
RiGHTS (Christine Debono & Tania Colwell eds., 2004). 
36 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 39 provides chat, "(w]hen considering che Bill of Rights, 
a court ... must consider international law .... § 233 provides that, "when interpreting any leg-
islation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any afternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international 
law." (emphasis added). 
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South African legal syscem .37 South Africa is party to several international human 
rights instruments that range from the elimination of racial discrimination, slavery 
and genocide, the suppression of human trafficking, the rights of women, children 
and refugees.38 Article 37-4(6)(1) of the Constitution specifically provides that 
emergency legislation enacted may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the 
extent that it is consistent with South Africa's obligations under international 
law.39 
In its founding provisions, the Constitution outlines the human rights principles 
on which the new democratic state is promised. These include: 
• Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms 
• Non-racialism and non-sexism 
• Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law 
• Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter's roll , regular elections and 
a mulci-party system of dem ocratic government, to ensure accountability 
responsiveness and openness.40 
The Constitution, with its expansive Bill of Rights, has been universally heralded 
for the range of protections it affords, and the purpos ive manner in which it 
affords such protections.41 For example, the Bill of Rights ouclaws both direct 
and indirect discrimination, an approach chat reflects a deep appreciation of the 
invidious m anner in which discrimination is manifest, both consciously and 
unconsciously. 42 The Bill of Rights contains a general commitment to equali ty 
before the law and equal protection under the law, and provides several grounds 
37 Id. § 232 specifical ly provides char customary international law is rhe law of South Africa unless 
such law contradicts the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. § 23 1 outlines the condi tions 
under which international agreements become part of South African law. § 198 provides rhar 
the Security services must act "in accordance with .. . customary international law and interna-
tional agreements .... " 
38 See Human Rights & Documentation Centre, Gender Issues and Democracy in Southern 
Africa, http://www.hrdc. unam.na/rsa_hr.hrm. 
39 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 37(4)(b)(i) . 
40 Id. §§ 1-6. 
4 1 See Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR 146 (1 998); 
see also Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational 
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16 SAJHR 206 (2000). 
42 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, para. 4 provides rhar, "[n] o person may discri minate 
directly or indirectly against any one on one or more grounds." For an interesting discussion on the 
subliminal manner in which, fo r example, racism is often manifest, see Charles Lawrence, 7he Id, 
the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN . L. REv. 317 (1987). 
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on which the states may not unfairly discriminate, including race, color, gender, 
religion, ethnicity, age, disability and sexual orientation. 43 In addition, the Bill of 
Rights recognizes that sometimes these grounds of discrimination overlap, 
and therefore incorporates protections against the intersectionality of different 
grounds of discriminarion. 44 The Bill of Rights protects the human rights of 
women, and in particular seeks to respond to the phenomenon of violence against 
women in several ways, including the outlawing of violence "from either public 
or private sources."45 Drawing from the African concept of ubuntu,46 the Bill of 
Rights provides for the right to have one's dignity respected and protected.47 
In particular, the following civil and political rights are protected: the right to 
life,48 freedom and security of the person,49 the right against slavery, servitude and 
forced labor,5° the right to privacy, freedom of religion, belief, expression, opinion, 
assembly, movement, association51 and a range of property52 and labor rights.53 In 
addition, the Constitution also incorporates the right of access to information,54 
to due process, the right to a fair trial and access to the courrs.55 All of these rights 
derive from chose incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
43 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, para. 3 provides chat " (c]he state may not unfairly dis-
criminate direccly or indirectly aga inst anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disabiliry, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth ." 
44 Id. § 9, para. 5 provides chat, "[d]iscrimination on one or more grounds ... is unfair unless it is es-
tablished chat che discrimination is fair." (emphasis added) . This concept of incerseccionaliry has 
been analyzed in some deta il by critical race scholars. See e.g., Kimberley Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margim: lntersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Agaimt Women of Color, in IDENTITIES 
175 (Linda Alcoff & Eduardo Mendieta eds., 2002); see also Angela H arris, Race and Essentialism 
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 581 (1991). 
45 Id. § 12(l)(c) provides chat, " (e]veryone has the right co securiry and freedom of che person 
which includes che right . .. co be free from all forms of violence from ei ther public or private 
sources .... " 
46 For an explanation of ubuntu, see Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuncu and che Law in South 
Africa at http:/ /epf.ecoporc. org/appendix3.hcml. 
47 S. AFR. CoNST. 1996, supra note 30, provides that, "[e)veryone has inherent digniry and the 
right co have their digniry respected and protected." 
48 Id. § 11. 
49 Id. § 11-12. 
50 Id.§ 13. 
5' Id.§ 15-18. 
52 Id.§ 25. 
53 Id. § 22-23. 
54 Id. § 32. 
55 Id. § 33-35. 
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In a series of cases, 
the South African Constitutional Court has interpreted the relevant constitutional 
right in light of the international human rights document from which it derives, 
thereby interpreting such international document in the South African context. 56 
For example, in S v Baloyi,57 in balancing the procedural rights of the accused, on 
the one hand, and the need to stem private violence against women, on the other, 
the Constitutional Court interpreted South Africa's obligations under the United 
Nations Declaration on Violence Against Women58 and Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,59 to reject a 
challenge to the constitutionality of domestic violence legislation.60 
In addition to these so-called first-generation rights, the Bill of Rights incor-
porates a range of socio-economic rights, including the right to an environment 
that is beneficial,61 the right to have access to housing,62 health care,63 food, water, 
social security,64 education.65 Theses social and economic rights are not available 
on demand, as first-generation rights are. That said, the state must provide these 
rights "within its available resources".66 Drawing from the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,67 the Bill of Rights provides for a series of children's rights, 
protecting them from abuse, but also providing for a host of socio-economic 
rights that they are entitled to, including the right to basic nutrition, health care, 
shelter and social services.68 
56 For example, in the first case heard by the Constitutional Court that involved the abolition of 
the death penalty, the Court went through an extended analysis of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
57 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
58 G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. , Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/49 (Dec. 20, 
1993). 
59 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. 
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sepe. 
3, 1981). 
60 S v Baloyi, supra note 57, at para. 13. 
61 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 24. 
62 Id.§ 26. 
63 Id.§ 27. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.§ 29. 
66 Id. 
67 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 
4th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sepe. 2, 
1990). 
68 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 28. 
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Under South African law, several bodies are mandated to pursue the human 
rights embodied in the Constitution, including: the Public Protector;69 the Human 
Rights Commission;70 the Commission for Gender Equality/I the Electoral 
Commission72 and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities.73 Of these bodies, the 
Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission are central to the imple-
mentation and enforcement of the human rights embodied in the Bill of Rights. 
The establishment of two separate bodies with ostensibly similar functions, albeit 
the one focusing only on gender, created controversy. Many women advocates were 
of the opinion chat a structure such as a Gender Commission would marginalize 
and even trivialize women's equality.74 They believed chat the pursuit of women's 
rights should be incorporated into a structure chat promotes rights for all.75 
Opponents argue chat only a separate body can deal comprehensively with gender 
equality concerns and develop a sustained and systemic approach to the eradica-
tion of sexism and pacriarchy.76 In the final analysis, the latter sentiments held sway 
and a separate body, the Gender Commission, was established. In addition to the 
constitutionally mandated bodies, several human rights bodies, including the office 
of the Status ofWomen, of the Office on the Rights of the Child and the Office on 
the Rights of People with Disabilities, have been set up in the office of the 
President. 
69 Id. § 182, empoweri ng the Public Protector to "investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the 
public administration, or in any sphere of government that is alleged or suspected to be improper 
or to result in any impropriety or prej udice .... " 
70 The Human Rights Commission is mandated to: "promote respect for human rights and a 
cultu re of human rights; promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights; 
monitor and assess the observance of human rights" in South Africa. Id. § 184 . 
71 The Commiss ion for Gender Equality is empowered to "promote respect for gender equali ty, 
and the protection, development and attainment of gender equali ty . ... " Id. § 187. 
72 The task of the Electoral Com mission is to "manage elections" and to "ensure that they are free 
and fair." Id. § 190. 
73 As its name suggests, the Comm iss ion is mandated to "promote respect for the rights of cultural, 
religious and lingu istic communities; to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tol-
erance and national unity amongst cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis 
of equality, non-discrimination and free association ... . " Id. § 185 . 
74 See Catherine Albertyn, National Machinery for Ensuring Gender Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION 
OF SouTH AFrucA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTivE 17 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995); see also 
Catherine Albertyn, Women a,:Jd the Transition to Democracy in South Africa, in GENDER AND 
THE SOUTH AFRJCAN LEGAL O~ER 39 (Christina Murray ed. 1994). 
75 For an interesting discuss ion of this debate, see Albertyn, National Machinery for Ensuring 
Gender Equality, supra note 74, at 16-17. 
76 See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South Africa, in 3 
MICH.). RAcE & L. 307, 330-331 (1998). 
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D. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and International Law 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has adopted a bold vision of human 
rights in its jurisprudence. Since its inception in 1995, the Constitutional Court 
has heard several cases that directly implicate the international human rights 
agenda embodied in the Constitution. In this endeavor the Constitutional Court 
has incorporated international human rights law in its interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights, and by doing so has spawned an international human rights jurisprudence 
that continues to be cited in many jurisdictions.77 Indeed, the international human 
rights legal literature constantly references the transformative human rights juris-
prudence of the South African Constitutional Court.78 
The Court's docket has included international legal issues in seve,al landmark 
cases. The first case that the Court heard in 1995, S v Makwanyane, concerned the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.79 The Court, invoking the right to life and 
right to dignity found in the Bill of Rights, the International Covenant on C ivil 
and Political Rights, and other human rights instruments, struck down the death 
penalty as unconstitutional.80 In this case, the Constitutional Court demonstrated 
its central role in the democratic transformation process in South Africa. The case, 
littered with references to international law, including the International Covenant 
on C ivil and Political Rights,81 and foreign law, including the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia82 has demonstrated that its approach 
was jurisprudentially expansive, as opposed to a more self-referential approach 
taken by the United Scates Supreme Court, for example. 
In a series of cases, the Court examined the question of equality, the paramount 
principle in the Bill of Rights and in international law. Exploring a range of factual 
situations, including those involving the rights of HN positive persons not to be 
77 See Jennifer L. Hube, Legal Representation for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 5 D u KE J . Co MP. & 
l NT'L L. 425 (1995) (ci ting S v Baloyi); Alan C larke, Terrorism, Extradition and the Death Penalty, 
29 WM . MITCHELL L. REv. 803 (2003); M artha L. Salomon, AIDS is Risky Business: Examining 
the Effects of the AIDS Crisis on Publicly Traded Companies in South Africa and the Implications for 
Both South African and US. Investors, 37 VAN D. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1473 (2004). 
78 See, eg., Klare, supra note 4 1; see also, DENNIS D Av1s, D EMOCRACY AND D ELIBERATION (1 999) . 
79 S v Makwanyane, supra note 56 . 
so Id., para. 15 1. 
8 1 Adopted and opened for signature, ratificatio n and accession by G.A. Res. 2200A (XXl), U .N. 
GAOR, 2 1st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U .N. Doc. A/63 19 (Dec. 16, 1966) (en tered in to fo rce Mar. 
23 1976)(mencioned at para. 62) . 
82 408 U.S. 238 (1 972) (mentioned at para. 40). 
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discriminated against in their employment,83 the rights of permanent residents not 
to be treated unfairly in comparison to citizens in the workplace,84 the rights of 
homosexuals to be engage in consenting sexual conduct85 and the rights of African 
girls and women not to be discriminated against under indigenous customary law,86 
the Court has formulated a substantive vision of equality.87 In doing so the Court 
has moved from a mere formal approach to one that recognizes the peculiar realities 
of South Africa and has attempted to contextualize equality within the South African 
context. 88 The court has accomplished this by embracing international human rights 
principles, whilst at the same time recognizing the peculiar context of South Africa's 
history of inequality, and the need to develop a comprehensive indigenous version 
of equality.89 
This was demonstrated in one of the earliest cases that analyzed the right to 
equality, in which the court was confronted with a challenge by a convicted male 
prisoner to a Presidential Pardon. 90 The challenged Presidential Pardon, issued by 
President Nelson Mandela after South Africa's first democratic election, had par-
doned certain categories of prisoners, including women in prison who had 
children under the age of twelve. 91 The complainant challenged the Presidential 
Pardon on the basis that it violated his constitutional rights to equality and that 
83 Hoffman v S. Afr. Airways 200 1 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (unan imously holding that the airline 
could not exclude an otherwise qual ified asymptomatic HIV-positive job applicant and rejecting 
the ai rline's economic interests as compelling when balanced against the infringement of the 
applicant's right to equality). 
84 Larbi-Odam v Member of the Exec. Council For Educ. (Nw Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) 
(S. Afr.) (unanimously invalidati ng a regulation that prohibited foreign citizens from permanent 
employment as teachers in state schools). 
85 Nar'l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (de-
claring unconstitutional the common law offense of sodomy and applicable criminal laws on 
sodomy). 
86 BHE v Mag. (1) SA 563 (CC) (S . Afr.) (finding the inheritance rules for black estates found in 
the Black Administration Act and the system of male primogeniture in African customary law 
inconsistent with the Constitution) . 
87 See Catherine Albertyn & Janet Kentridge, Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim 
Constitution, 10 SAJHR 149 (1994). 
88 See Pierre de Vos, Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual 
Fairness, 17 SAJHR 258 (2001). 
89 A classic example was AZAPO v Pres. of the Republic of S. Afr., supra note 3, in which the 
Constitutional Court struck down a challenge to the amnesty provisions of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Com mission. Refognizing the important international human rights principles 
implicated in the amnesty provisions, the Court nonetheless rejected the international law ap-
proach, in favor of che principles agreed co during South Africa's negotiations towards a consti-
tutional democracy. 
90 President of the Republic of S. Afr.~ Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
91 Presidential Act No. 17 of 1994. 
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it discriminated against him on the basis of sex. The Court, in its judgment, 
engaged in a comprehensive discussion of equality. 
Applying the tes t outlined in the Constitution, the C ourt found chat the dis-
crimination was unfair.92 But the Court also found that the discrimination could 
be justified because of the benefits derived from the pardon, including those that 
accrued co children and their mochers;93 in the Court's opinion, the latter was 
clearly the most disadvantaged group in South African society. Although 
acknowledging that its findings may reinfo rce a stereotype about women, child 
caring and child rearing, the Court recognized that mothers are the primary 
caregivers of children. The C ourt saw its approach as pragmatic: one that placed 
the issue squarely within the reality of the South Afri can context. Finding the 
discrimination valid, the Court stated chat because women have hiswrically been 
discriminated against, the adoption of chis contextual approach would benefit 
women, and not perpetuate a disadvantage.94 A li teral reading of the Court's 
judgment suggests a contradiction of one of the principles incorporated in The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) , namely, chat state parties need: 
To ensure chat family education includes a proper understanding of materni ty as a 
social function and the recognition of the common responsibili ty of men and 
women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood 
chat the interest of che,children is the primordial consideration in al l cases.95 
The dissent forcefully challenged the pragmatic approach taken by the majority 
and the stereotypes chat the majori ty appeared to perpetuate, stating very clearly 
chat the Constitution was meant to be transformative.96 But the majority judg-
ment, despite the dissent, reflected that the judges interpreted the Constitution 
as not just providing a formal flavor to equality. They grappled with both the 
92 The Constitution articulates a two-part test fo r fi nding discrimination. First, if discrimination is 
alleged and found on any of the listed grounds, such as race, gender, marital status or national-
ity, that finding creates a presumption of un fa irness. The person against whom the al legation of 
discrimination is made must then rebut the presumption of unfai rness by showing the validity 
of the action. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 9, paras. I & 5. 
93 President of the Republic ofS. Afr. v Hugo, supra note 90, paras. 39 & 47. 
94 "In this case, mothers have been afforded an advantage on the basis of a proposition that is gen-
erally speaki ng true. There is no doubt that the goal of equal ity entrenched in our constitu tion 
were better served if the responsibilities fo r child rearing were more fa irly shared between moth-
ers and fathers. The simple fact of the matter is that at present they are not. For the moment 
then, and for some time to come, mothers are going to carry greater burdens than fa thers in the 
rearing of child ren. We cannot ignore th is crucial fac t in considering the impact of discrimina-
tion in this case." Id., (judgment of Jus tice O 'Regan at 113). 
95 Article 5(6), http://www. un .org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/tex t/econven tion.htm#article5. 
96 President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Hugo, supra note 90, at 63 (judgment of Justice Kriegler) . 
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contemporary realities of formal equality in South Africa, and the deeply 
entrenched patterns of gender equality, one of the legacies of apartheid. As so 
eloquently stated by Justice O'Regan: 
To determine whether the discrimination is unfair it is necessary co recognize that 
although the long-term goal of our constitutional order is equal treatment, insisting 
upon equal treatment in circumstances of established inequality may well result in 
the entrenchment of that inequality.97 
In its approach to curbing violence against women, several decisions of the Court 
have been particularly compelling. In these decisions, the Court utilized the imper-
atives in the Bill of Rights, as well as those found in international instruments such 
as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women98 and the Vienna Declaration on Violence Against Women.99 The 
Court adopted a purposive approach, outlining very clearly in its pronouncements 
the need to eradicate the ubiquitous problem of violence against women in South 
Africa, and has applied this approach in both the public as well as the private law 
arena. In S v Baloyi, a challenge to South Africa's domestic violence legislation, the 
Court has articulated clearly that while it will protect the procedural rights of those 
accused of domestic violence, it will ensure that the constitutional mandate that 
prohibits all forms of violence, including violence committed in the home, be 
clearly pursued to protect women. 100 Justice Albie Sachs, writing an impressive 
judgment for the majority noted: 
All crime has harsh effects on society. What distinguishes domestic violence is its hid-
den repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and in par-
ticular, on family life. It cuts across class, race, culture and geography, and is all the 
more pernicious because it is so often concealed and so frequently goes unpunished. 101 
The Court, reinforcing its commitment to stemming public violence against 
women, has held the police and other government authorities liable where they 
negligently failed to protect women from violence committed by third parties. 102 
By doing so the Court has infused into the common law, in this case the law of 
97 Id. at 112 (judgment of Justice O 'Regan). 
98 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G. A. Res. 34/180 U.N. 
GAOR, 34'" Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sepe. 
3, 1981). 
99 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONE 157/23 July 12, 1993. 
100 S v Baloyi, supra note 57. 
101 ld. at 11. 
102 Alix Jean Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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torts, the principles embodied in the Constitution. 103 In this case the police and 
· prosecutors had recommended the release without bail of a man awaiting trial on 
a charge of attempted rape, and who later brutally attacked another woman. The 
Court held that the common law could be sufficiently developed to impose on 
police and prosecutors a legal duty to protect such third parties, in light of the 
Constitution and international law's prohibition on gender discrimination and 
the right to dignity, freedom and security of women.J04 
The Court has struck an impressive balance between the competing rights of 
privacy and state regulation, 105 and religious rights and equality, 106 appreciating 
the context of the lived realities and steadfastly held beliefs of individuals and 
groups, and the need to create a society predicated on equality and dignity. In 
the same vein the Court has tried to strike a healthy accord between the rights of 
criminals in a very violent society, such as South Africa, and the rights of individ-
uals to security of the person. 107 
By far the most impress ive accomplishments of the Court has been its slow evolu-
tion of a socio-rights jurisprudence that attempts to redress the appalling economic 
conditions within which a large number of South Africans still find themselves. 
Mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers and not wish,ing to overcome the 
prerogative of Parliament, the Court has nonetheless attempted to ensure that the 
103 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 39, para. 2, provides that, " [w]hen interpreting any legis-
lation and when developing the common law . .. every court, tribunal o r fo rum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights ." (em phasis added). 
104 Alix Jean Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec., supra note I 02, para. 33. 
105 See Nat'l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice, supra note 85. See also De Reuck 
v Dir. Pub. Prosec. (WL.D.) 2004 (I) SA 406 (CC) (S . Afr.) (finding a law prohibiting the im-
portation and possession of child pornography to be a reasonable interference with privacy and 
not overbroad, given an objective definition of child pornography whose primary element is the 
stimulation of erotic rather than aesthetic feeling, and the presence of a good cause exemption fo r 
individuals conducting research on child pornography). 
106 See C hristian Educ. S. Afr. v Minister of Educ. (4) SA 757 (CC) (S. Afr.) (recognizing that 
corporal punishment in Christian schools may constitute an important part of religious identity 
and ethos, the Court nonetheless upheld a law of general applicability prohibiting corporal pun-
ishment in schools given the compelling public interest in protecting students from physical and 
emotional abuse and what it viewed as a limited interference in the ability of parents to other-
wise follow their religious conscience). See also Prince v Pres. of the Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding the right of rhe Rastafarian religion rouse 
cannabis as part of rhe religious practice outweighed by the state's interest in enforcing drug leg-
islation intended to curb its use). 
107 See Alix Jean Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec., mpra note 102. See also K v Minister of 
Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) (S. Afr.). . 
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government addresses the needs of the poor in the country. In The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa, et al. v Grootboom and Others, 108 a case widely regarded as 
international test case on the enforceability of social and economic rights, the Court 
outlined in great detail the obligation of the government to provide housing for 
those desperate for shelter. The case concerned an application for temporary shelter 
brought by a group of people, including a number of children, who were without 
shelter following their brutal eviction from private land on which they were squat-
ting. The conditions under which the community lived were deplorable. They had 
access to water through one tap that served hundreds of people, and no sanitation 
facilities. The Court affirmed that the government had a duty in terms of Section 26 
of the Constitution (the right to adequate housing) 109 to adopt reasonable policy, 
legislative and budgetary measures to provide relief for people who have no access to 
land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions. The 
judgment also dealt in details with the implications of the children's socio-economic 
rights enshrined in Section 28.11 0 
The Court dealt in some detail with the provisions in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and in particular 
the articles that outline the substantive nature of the rights incorporated in the 
Covenant as well as the obligations of states to take reasonable steps to realize 
those rights. 111 Elaborating in the obligation in both ICESR and the South 
African Constitution, the Court determined that the government had the duty 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfill these rights. 11 2 In addition, the Court 
examined the comments of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC), and particularly the comment that socio-eco-
nomic rights contain a minimum core. 11 3 The Court, pointing out that ICESCR 
108 200 1 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) . 
109 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 26 provides chat: "(l) Everyone has che right co have ac-
cess co adequate housing. (2) The state muse cake reasonable legislative and ocher measures, 
within its available resources, co achieve the progress ive realization of this right. (3) No one may 
be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished .... " 
11 0 Id.§ 28 covers a range of rights co which children are entitled, including bas ic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care and social services. 
111 In particular, the Court analyzed § 11.1 of the Covenant, which provides chat the "[t]he Stace 
parties co the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone co an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, ... The Seate parties 
will cake appropriate steps co ensure the realization of chis right .. . . " § 2.1 of the Covenant pro-
vides that, "[e]ach State parry to the present Covenant undertakes co cake seeps, . . . co che maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view co achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by al l appropriate means." 
11 2 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 7, para. 2. 
11 3 Gov'c of Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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. provides for the right to housing, whereas the South African Constitution pro-
vides a right of access co housing, rejected the "minimum core" approach and 
instead opted for one chat imposed on the South African the requirement of rea-
sonableness in its housing policy. 11 4 Although the Court engaged in an extensive 
analysis of ICESR and the obligations as articulated by ECOSOC, the Court 
concluded chat the concept "minimum core" did not create sufficient flexibility 
and appreciation of the peculiar conditions of South Africa. 11 5 
In line with its requirement of reasonableness, the Court has also mandated the 
government, in compliance with the right to health as delineated in the Bill of 
Rights, 11 6 as well as the rights of children, 11 7 to provide anti-retroviral drugs to 
HIV-positive pregnant women at public hospitals throughout South Africa. 11 8 The 
Court has also protected chose who are not South African citizens from violations 
of their constitutional socio-economic rights, holding chat a scheme that excluded 
permanent residents from social assistance was discriminatory and unfair.11 9 
The above analysis demonstrates the manner in which the Constitutional Court 
has embraced international legal principles, and particularly with regard to . its 
human rights, equality and socio-economic rights jurisprudence. And even though 
the Court may not have adopted the methodological apprm1ches of the relevant 
international human rights body, such as its diversion from that taken by the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the question of 
the minimum core content of a right, the Court has for the most part embraced 
both the substance and the spirit of the various international legal documents. 
In some cases, however, the Court has found that resort to international law was 
irrelevant or marginal co the determination of the constitutionality or otherwise of a 
statute or other form of governmental action. 120 This was essentially the approach 
11 4 Id. paras. 27-29. ' 
11 5 Id. para. 33. 
11 6 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 27 provides chat everyone "has che right co have access co 
health care services, including reproductive heal ch care" and chat the ''state muse cake reasonable 
legislative and ocher measures, within its available resources, co achieve che progressive realiza-
tion of all of these rights .... " 
11 7 Gov'c of Republic of S. Afr. v. G roocboom, supra note 11 3. 
11 8 Minister of H eal ch v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (2) SA 72 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (fi nd ing 
unreasonable the govern ment's refusal co make widely available the anti-retroviral drug nevirap-
ine until it had further tested the safety and efficacy of che drug and its failure co sec out a time 
frame for a national program co reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV). 
119 Khosa v. Minister Soc. Dev.; Mahlaule v. M inister Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(finding in the scheme a violation of the righ t co equal ity as well as finding that the Constitution 
vests a right co social security in "everyone"). 
120 For a thoughtful analysis of the way in which the Consticucional Cou rt "reads in and out" inter-
national law, see Catherine Adcock Admay, Constitutional Comity: Medfating the Rule of Law 
Divide, 26 N.C. J. Inc'! & Com. Reg. 723 (2001). 
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taken by the Court in a highly publicized case challenging both the constitutionality 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as well as its putative violation 
of international law, 121 in particular, the international law requirement that those 
who commit gross violations of human rights be punished as mandated by four 
Geneva Conventions. 122 In this case the Court was faced by a challenge from family 
members of those tortured and killed by the South African government, that the 
empowering statute of the TRC, 123 and especially its amnesty committee, 124 was 
both unconstitutional and in violation of international law. 125 
The petitioners claimed that the well-established international legal principle, 
that the perpetrator of gross violations of human rights has to compensate the 
victim for the injuries suffered, are clearly violated by the amnesty provisions of 
the T.R.C. 126 Regarding the constitutionality of the TRC statute, the petitioners 
claimed that the amnesty provision immunized perpetrators of gross violations 
of human rights from criminal and civil liability. This immunity applies as well 
to those who might be held vicariously liable for the perpetrators' actions, includ-
ing state authorities.127 These amnesty provisions clearly violated the Constitution, 
which provided that: 
Every person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of 
law, or where appropriate, another independent or impartial forum. 128 
The petitioners argued that the amnesty committee was neither a "court of law" 
nor an "independent or impartial forum", and that the amnesty committee was 
not empowered to settle "justiciable disputes." 129 The petitioners relied on the 
well established international law principle that those who are victims of gross 
121 AZAPO v Pres. of che Republic of S. Afr., supra note 3. 
122 Article 49 of the first Geneva Convention For che Amelioration of che Condition of che 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in che Field; Article 50 of the second Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea; 
Article 29 of the Third Geneva Convention relative co the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and 
Article 46 of the fourth Geneva Convention relative co the Protection of Civilian Persons during 
time ofWar. See Id., para. 25. 
123 Promotion of National Un ity and Reconciliation Ace No. 34 of 1995. 
124 In terms of che statute, amnesty is co be granted co all "persons who make full disclosure of all 
the relevant faces relati ng co aces associated with a political objective . ... " Id.,§ 3(1)(6) . 
125 AZAPO v Pres. of the Republic of S. Afr. , supra note 3, para. 25. 
126 Id. 
127 These amnesty provisions are contained in § 20 of the Promotion of National Un ity and 
Reconci liation Act, supra note 123. 
128 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, supra note 30, § 22. 
129 AZAPO v Pres. of che Republic of S. Afr., supra note 3, para. 8. 
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human righrs violations have the right of access to a legal forum to have their 
claims considered and adjudicated. 130 
In a detailed judgment, the Court in effect skirted the relevant international 
legal principles by focusing only on the constitutionality of the TRC. Judge 
Mahomed, writing for the majority, found that the TRC had in fact passed con-
stitutional muster. Even though the Constitution clearly provided the right to 
have "justiciable disputes settled by a court of law," the same section empowers 
the South African government to provide amnesties for past wrongs where it is 
deemed appropriate. 131 
The holding in this case generated some controversy, as many commentators 
were of the opinion that the Court gave short shrift to international law by refus-
ing to engage with the relevant issues in its deliberations. 132 It is arguable that the 
Court in fact followed the contextual approach it adopted in other cases, and 
that the constitutional principles provided the Court with a sufficient basis on 
which to dispose of the challenge to the TRC. The Court has also noted that 
although the Constitution mandates the Court to consider international law, it 
does not have to adopt such law. 
E. Conclusion 
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the South African Constitution and its 
Bill of Rights, coupled with an impressive equality and human rights jurispru-
dence generated by the Constitutional Court, has been admired widely. I tried to 
demonstrate that healthy synergy between international legal principles and the 
South African constitutional principles, and how each set injected into the other 
the possibilities of human rights transformation. I also tried to demonstrate how 
the Constitutional Court has been strategically mindful of its mandate under the 
Constitution to consider international and foreign law, and to use international 
law to pursue the agenda of transformation envisioned by the Constitution . But 
130 Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report Submitted by Mr. 1heo 
Van Boven, Special Rapporteur, United Nations Human Rights Commission, U.N. Doc. El 
CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 Quly 2, 1993). 
131 S. AFR. CoNST. 1996, supra note 30, § 22. 
132 See, e.g., John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: 7he South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L 
LEGAL & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 277 (1998); see also Ziyad Motala, 7he Constitutional Court's 
Approach to International Law and its Method of Interpretation in the 'Amnesty Decision'.· Intellectual 
Honesty or Political Expediency? 21 SAYIL 29 (1996). 
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the Court has also been mindful of the contextual realities of South Africa, and 
has attempted to cultivate an indigenous human rights jurisprudence, that will 
take root in South Africa even though it draws from international and compara-
tive human rights principles. 
Of course the human rights project in South Africa extends beyond the text of 
the Bill of Rights or the deliberations of the Constitutional Court and other legal 
bodies mandated to interpret and enforce the Bill of Rights. The reality of pov-
erty and the gross economic inequalities so pervasive in South Africa threaten to 
undermine the constitutional project. Moreover, the increasingly privatized 
nature of the South African economy may corrode the possibilities generated by 
the incorporation of socio-economic rights in the Constitution. In order for the 
formal constitutional project to be effective, at the minimum it has to give rise to 
a culture of human rights. 
Just as apartheid was a concern of the global community, so too the contem-
porary constitutional project in South Africa generates significant global interest. 
One aspect of the transformation process, that is, the formal incorporation of 
human rights is underway. The challenge for South Africa is to translate those 
formal rights into tangible political, social and economic rights . 
